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Aherns: Advocacy Ideals and the Representation of Children

ADVOCACY IDEALS AND THE REPRESENTATION
OF CHILDREN
GARY

A.

AHRENS*

INTRODUCTION

This article explores the advocate's responsibilities to children and other
legally incompetent persons insofar as they can be deduced from the ideals and
rules of advocacy.' Advocacy ethics spring from a cultural tradition that
obligates the strong to use their strength on behalf of the weak and helpless.
The task of the ethical attorney is thus to articulate and amplify the client's
pleas. This task is complicated when the client is a minor or other legal incompetent who may be incapable of communicating those pleas. In such situations, the client's parent or guardian conveys to the lawyer a plea which is
presumably in the incompetent's best interests. An attorney who represents a
legally incompetent client is thus actually representing the interests of two
people, the incompetent and the guardian, and is engaged in what the Code of
2
Professional Responsibility calls "multiple employment."
THE FAMILY AS MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT

An ideally ethical lawyer3 must make several determinations before accepting multiple employment and must reconsider them throughout the duration
of that employment: 4 first, that his "independent professional judgment in
*B.A., University of Chicago, 1970; J.D., University of Virginia, 1973.
I. In 1908 tile American Bar Association adopted the first canons of Professional Ethics
which were based upon the Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association. Preface to
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY (Final Draft 1969), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

XV

(1979). These canons were re-

placed in 1969 by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. The latest revision of the rules
governing a lawyer's responsibilities occurred in August, 1983 when the ABA adopted the
MODE. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 RULES].
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B) (1981) [hereinafter cited
as 1981 CODE] which reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)
(emphasis added).
The Model Rules refer to the representation of multiple clients as "common representation." 1983 RULES, supra note 1, at rule 1.7(b)(2).
3. The theory of course assumes that the lawyer is competent, is thoroughly familiar
with the Code of Professional Responsibility, and makes every effort to conform his conduct
to it.
4. See, e.g., 1983 RULES, supra note 1, at rule 1.14(a) & (b); Cantor, Privacy and the
Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 255 (1977) (a next of kin
cannot always appropriately make life or death decisions for an incompetent).
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is [not] likely to be adversely affected" and second, that

multiple employment "would [not] be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests."5 Nonetheless, an attorney may undertake a multiple representation that will likely result in his representing differing interests, provided
he determines that "it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest
of each" 6 client and that each client "consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each."7 To represent both
parent and child, an attorney must have obtained their consent after disclosing
his appraisal of the harmonies and disharmonies of their interests.8
The lawyer's determination whether to accept such multiple employment
is usually simplified by the legal presumption that parents act in the best
interests of their children. This presumption gives parents discretion to make
decisions for their minor children until, upon reaching the legal age of emancipation, the child is deemed morally mature and capable of making decisions
autonomously. The recently developed notion of "substituted judgment" extends similar decisionmaking discretion to parents and guardians of mental
incompetents who remain immature after the age of emancipation. If the presumption holds that parents and guardians act in their charge's "best interests"
an attorney may avoid determining whether an incompetent can consent to
multiple representation and whether the attorney can adequately represent
both the parent's and incompetent's interests. 9
The concept of substituted judgment, however, is not always legally
sufficient to resolve all multiple representation problems.1- Should the state
suspect that a parent's decisions relating to the nurture and protection of a
child are outside the area of parental discretion, 1 or are an abuse of that dis-

5. 1981 CODE, supra note 2, at DR 5-105(A), (B). See also 1983 RUI.Es, supra note 1, at rules
1.7(b), 2.2(c). Under the Model Rules, an attorney may not engage in common representation
unless he "reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected" and the client
consents after informed disclosure. Id. at 1.7(b).
6. 1981 CODE, supra note 2, at DR 5-105(C).
7. Id.
8. Id. See also 1983 Ruirxs, supra note 1, at rules 1.7, 2.2.
9. Although the minor's parents usually finance the attorney's services, the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of a client cannot be directed by someone who is paying for
the services. 1981 CODE, supra note 2, at DR 5-107(B). See also id. at DR 5-107(A) (prohibits

accepting compensation or things of value from one other than the client unless the client
consents after full disclosure).
The Model Rules provide that a lawyer may not take payment from one other than the
client unless the client consents, and the payment does not interfere with the attorney's independence of professional judgment. 1983 RuLs, supra note 1, at rule 1.8(f).
10. The legal fiction of a parent as trustee for the child implies that the law has become
concerned with the details of that fiduciary responsibility. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375
Mass. 733, 379 N.E2d 1053 (1978), aff'd on rehearing,378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
11. Parents ordinarily are accorded complete discretion to decide how a conflict between
themselves and their ward will be resolved (when, for example, the issue is the appropriateness of watching television programs or a child's innovations in table manners). By comparison, the state allows parents to choose the school their child will attend, but does not
extend that discretion to include the issue of whether or not that child will attend school.
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cretion, then the parent's judgment is subject to review by the courts.' 2 When
parents' decisions are under review, the child is a formal legal adversary of the
parent and is entitled to an advocate. 13
In In re Quinlan14 the New Jersey courts reviewed a father's decision to
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment for his disabled daughter, Karen.
The trial judge denied the father's request to be appointed his daughter's
guardian and instead appointed an attorney as guardian ad litem to represent
Karen's interests.' 5 While finding the father of suitable character and sincere
motivation, the trial court was unsure of his judgment under the stressful circumstances.' 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's decision, discharged the attorney, and appointed the father as Karen's guardian. 7 The
court ruled that simply because Karen was in a "non-cognitive, vegetative"
state, she should not be deprived of the right to choose her own medical
treatment, and that right could be exercised by her guardian.' 8 Based on a
12. The case-to-case approach which predominates the modern law of parent-child reflects the dynamic elements of the situations which come before it. It is chiefly occupied with
two kinds of determinations: (1) whether an individual child is sufficiently mature to be
morally responsible; and (2) whether the development of an individual child towards this
maturity is seriously threatened by the child's environment - the acts or omissions of parents
being an important part of that environment.
13. Often the advocate for the child's interest will be a government attorney representing the state investigating agency which originally questioned the parent's exercise of responsibilities. Child abuse and neglect proceedings are examples of such instances, but the
same basic principle applies when the parent is the state, and the child should have a
lawyer in such a controversy. As parent, the state has discretion regarding certain decisions
about what is "best" for the child or legal incompetent.
When juvenile courts were new it was theoretically posited that the courts would always
act in the children's best interests, even if their parents had not. Since that time, both common
sense and the factual research of social scientists have indicated that the state as parent may
also neglect its responsibilities. This recognition has prompted the reassertion of procedural
due process rights for children and the provision of counsel for a child in proceedings where
a potential conflict of interest exists between the state and its ward. See generally, Paulsen,
Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. LJ. 527, 527 (1968) (discussing In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) in which the Supreme Court imposed certain due process requirements on
juvenile proceedings); Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in
Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1156, 1156 (1968) (discussing current attempts to "legalize"
juvenile courts by requiring counsel and observance of due process).
Similarly, children involved in custody disputes between parents are provided separate
counsel because parents are likely to be too preoccupied with their own conflicting interests
to meet their responsibilities as parents and represent the child's interests. "When two terriers
fight over a bone, the bone does not join the fighting. But a child is not a thing [n]or an object
to go as a prize to the winner of a contest. It is a precious, unique, individual human being."
Hansen, GuardiansAd Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests,
4 J. FAM. L. 181, 181 (1964). Cf. Watson, Children, Families and Courts: Before the Best
Interests of the Child and Parham v. J. R., 66 VA. L. Rev. 653 (1980) (state intervention into
family life should be limited to extreme cases).
14. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
15. Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 670.
16. Id., 355 A.2d at 671.
17. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 670.
18. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
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statutory presumption favoring appointment of the next of kin, the court permitted the father's judgment to substitute for that of his incompetent
daughter.' 9 The court further stated that "sincere, moral, ethical and religious"
parents with "strength of purpose and character" 20 are unlikely to make a decision adverse to their child's best interests.
The supreme court's opinion virtually disregards the ethics rules against
conflicts of interest which prescribe that the attorney obtain the clients' informed consent before undertaking a multiple representation. Presumably,
Karen's father, as a layman, would not exercise the same critical and disinterested judgment as that of a competent lawyer. Nonetheless, the court's opinion
suggests that the father's judgment insulates the attorney from the ethical
problem. Does Quinlan stand for the proposition that an attorney representing
a disabled client may regard the client's guardian as the client in determining
all conflict questions? The recently adopted American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct obliquely implies otherwise: "If a legal representative has not been appointed [for a disabled client], the lawyer should see
to such an appointment where it would serve the client's best interests."21-Thus
the Rules concede that appointing an attorney as guardian ad litem may not
be in the incompetent client's best interests, although apparently only because
it may be unnecessarily expensive or unpleasant. When a representative has
ordinarily look to the representabeen appointed, however, "the lawyer should
22
client."
the
of
behalf
on
tive for decisions
The public prosecutor and the state attorney general were advocates for
Karen's interests - but only insofar as her interests coincided with those of the
State of New Jersey. These attorneys did not litigate whether terminating the
treatment would be in Karen's "best interests"; they litigated whether terminating life-sustaining treatment would constitute a criminal offense. The issue of
"best interests" could only be validly litigated if Karen Quinlan had separate
counsel whose only loyalty was to her. Because the trial court appointed an
attorney as guardian ad litem, who himself was represented by counsel in the
process, Karen Quinlan's interest could have been zealously protected. The
value of individual autonomy and the Code's demands on lawyers were reaffirmed at the trial court level.
The New Jersey Supreme Court undercut this preservation of individual
autonomy by declaring unnecessary the appointment of an independent
guardian for Karen's person. The statutory preference for the next of kin to be
appointed guardians of incompetent adults is similar to the preference for
natural parents as guardians of their biological children. Both preferences rely
on the concept of substituted judgment and are thus subject to the suspicion
of confficting interests. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to appoint
the father as guardian required the guardian's attorney to represent the interests
of both parent and child. Such multiple representation leads to not only the

19. Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 671.
20.

Id.

21. 1988 RuLs, supra note 1,rule 1.14 comment (emphasis added).
22. Id.
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"lack of adversary process," 23 but also to careless advocacy. A case decided after
Quinlan demonstrates the effects of such insensitivity to advocacy ethics.
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT VS. ADVOCACY RESPONSIBILITIES

Joseph Saikewicz was a long time resident of the Belchertown State School
in Massachusetts. 24 At the time the action was filed he was sixty-seven years old
and suffering from leukemia. He had an I.Q. of ten and a mental age of approximately three years. The state school had concluded that Saikewicz should
not be given chemotherapy treatments and should be allowed to die. As
Saikewicz' "parent," the school realized that its proposed action included such
a serious risk of abuse of discretion that some safeguard was necessary to protect its "child." The state school therefore petitioned the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem to "make the necessary decisions concerning the care and
treatment"'2 5 of Saikewicz.

At trial the state school's counsel introduced evidence including a medical
report to show that Saikewicz should not be treated. The attorney appointed
as guardian ad litem asked only one question in cross-examining the school's
witnesses, and did not contest their conclusion that Saikewicz should be allowed
to die. 26 Although the judge expressed interest in hearing arguments in favor
of treating Saikewicz, Saikewicz' counsel did not respond, and the judge did
not order a response.

27

We may infer from his inaction that Saikewicz' guardian ad litem assumed
Saikewicz would have refused chemotherapy treatments had he been competent. This assumption may not be accurate. But even if it were, does it alter
the guardian's duty as an attorney? By analogy, suppose an incompetent client
had been accused of a crime. Certainly a lawyer would neither assume that his
client would plead guilty nor would he enter a guilty plea unless his client
could be made thoroughly aware of the plea's consequences. Even when a defense attorney believes his client is guilty, he is professionally obligated to make
those who would affect his client's life or liberty meet a standard of proof.
Should not also an attorney representing an innocent but incompetent person
put those who propose to affect that person's well-being to their proof? The
incompetent's attorney must seek to preserve his client's interests through the
adversarial process, in this case, due to the possibility, however remote, that
Saikewicz could become competent and choose treatment.
Saikewicz' lawyer confused the separate advocacy roles of guardian ad litem
and attorney. A guardian's responsibility is to exercise "substituted judgment";
the attorney's professional responsibility is to act as a check on that judgment.
Saikewicz' attorney assumed a parental role even though Saikewicz already had
a parent, the State of Massachusetts. Rather than serving as a check on the state
23. See Baron, Assuring Detached but Passionate Investigation and Decision: The Role of
Guardians Ad Litem in Saikewicz Type Cases, 4 A-. J.L. MED. 111, 119-29 (1978).
24. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417, 420 (1977).
25. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
26. See Baron, supra note 23, at 121.
27. See id. at 121-22.
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school's parental judgment, Saikewicz' attorney acted as advocate for his own
assumed parental persona. By agreeing with the medical report and refusing
to criticize it, he deprived the court of hearing a "case and controversy." Indeed,
Saikewicz' guardian ad litem did not even recognize the controversy's existence,
having already decided for himself that treatment would not benefit Saikewicz. 28
This lawyer/guardian ad litem confused Saikewicz' interest with speculations about Saikewicz' preference. Not imagining his client would prefer
treatment, he failed to argue for his client's interest. Saikewicz, like all legally
incompetent persons, had what might be termed a contingent right in a full
legal personality which vests upon loss of the disability. If and when the incompetent's disability disappears, he will be entitled to all the rights, privileges,
and responsibilities of a legally competent person, including the right to make
his own medical decisions. Though contingent, this interest is presently owned
and thus warranted protection by Saikewicz' attorney.
The lawyer for a minor or an incompetent must endeavor to recognize the
essential difference between the two roles of advocate and advisor. 29 The attorney who cannot because of the client's incompetence advise a client or heed
the clients wishes, nonetheless has a role as advocate for those interests which
the law presumes to exist. As an advocate, the lawyer appropriately asks "what
ought to be done to further my client's interests?" The lawyer as counselor
poses the different question of "what is the best outcome for my client?"
Saikewicz' attorney, asking the latter question, substituted his judgment for
his client's and thus failed to meet his responsibility as an advocate.
The trial judge could have directed Saikewicz' lawyer to be a "zealous advocate" for Saikewicz' interests. The judge was apparently disturbed by the
non-existence of open controversy, 30 but he did not press Saikewicz' attorney
hard enough for the attorney to question his own conclusions about Saikewicz'
interests. On review, the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not directly address
either the attorney's advocacy ethics or the trial judge's supervision of that advocacy. Instead it reaffirmed that life-risking medical treatment decisions by
guardians must be overseen by the justice system, and that every possible
interest of the incompetent must be considered. In addition, the court carefully set out a procedure to ensure such protection for incompetents in future
cases.

The Saikewicz decision has been strongly criticized for intruding into the
discretionary realm of physicians and parents:
28. Our justice system has assumed a fiduciary obligation to "realize the best interests
of the child." Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. Cr. REv. 167, 170. While this principle is itself uncontestable, it leaves open to

argument almost every one of its applications to particular circumstances. The argument is
always over what is judged to be factually the "best" for the child in question. See, e.g., C.
PERELMAN & L. OLmBRclrrs-TYTzcA, THE NEw PimToaC 84 (trans. 1969).

That the Saikewicz decision was controversial, that is, that reasonable people could disagree about what was in Saikewicz' best interest, can be inferred from the fact that the school
staff reversed its opinion after it had made that opinion formally known to the court. Baron,
supra, note 23, at 120.

29. See 1981 CODE, supra note 2, at EC 7-3 (a lawyer may serve simultaneously as advisor
and advocate but the two roles are different).

30. See Baron, supra note 23, at 121-22.
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In the Saikewicz case . . . the court emphatically rejected the Quinlan

solution, asserting instead that only the courts were qualified to decide
life or death issues for incompetent patients. Saikewicz stunned and dismayed the medical profession in Massachusetts as had few other legal
rulings within memory. Not only did it reject the authority of parents
and physicians to make life and death decisions for incompetent
patients, but it declared that henceforth all such decisions, after the appointment of a guardian ad litem, would have to be brought before a
probate court for an adversarial type of courtroom proceeding and
judicial resolution.31
The author's use of the phrase "adversarial type" has a vaguely pejorative
ring about it, as if he resented "legalistic" interlopers who do not trust doctors
and parents. Nevertheless, nonadversarial "courtroom proceedings and judicial
resolutions" simply do not exist. The author fails to recognize that our judicial
system is responsible for protecting the individual from arbitrary, even if wellintentioned, exercises of power. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted, the
question of whether to withhold potentially life-prolonging treatment from
one incapable of making his own decision is one which particularly requires
"the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms
32
the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created."
CONCLUSION

Cases involving the representation of children provide the most conspicuous examples of attorneys' undeveloped moral consciousness. In such
cases, attorney's are most likely to be "judges of their own cases" when a conflict of interest arises between the attorney and client. What should be done
with a Karen Quinlan or a Joseph Saikewicz, whether their fates should be
left to the unfettered discretion of their "parents", is a decision which every
legal system must make. But the advocate's duty to the helpless exists prior to
and independent of our particular legal system's constitution, procedures, or
theory of rights and duties. It lives in our legal and cultural tradition - and
33
we keep it alive whether or not we can derive it as a matter of formal logic.
So long as we keep the advocacy ideal before us there will be no danger that
the right of persons to justice as individuals will cease to be a part of our legal
tradition.
31. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. MED. 233, 234
(1978).
32. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
33. Cf. Nolan-Haley, Defective Children, Their Parents and the Death Decision, 4 J. LEG.
Jan., 1976 at 9. "As early as 1957, British author Glanville Williams argues: '[Ain
eugenic killing by a mother, exactly paralleled by the bitch that kills misshapen puppies,
cannot be confidently pronounced as immoral. And where this certainly is lacking, should not
liberty prevail?' " Id. at 10 (quoting G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL
MED.,

LAw 20 (1957)).
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